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Through effective educational transmission cultural traditions are passed on to subsequent 
generations. The presence of alternative theoretical views of reality (paradigms) in various 
academic disciplines uprooted the positivistic conviction that genuine science ought to be 
‘objective’ and ‘neutral’. The background of this view is found in Renaissance and post-
Renaissance philosophy, with its initial points of culmination in the thought of the 18th century 
philosopher, Immanuel Kant. He safe-guarded autonomous human freedom by restricting 
scholarship to phenomena (subject to the universal law of causality). The dialectic between 
nature and freedom gave direction to modern philosophy. Non-reductionist orientations 
eventually emerged recognising what is irreducible. Although a sound academic culture, 
operative within supervision to doctoral students, must pay attention to argumentative 
skills and informal logic, it must at the same time acknowledge the limitations of logic. The 
principle of sufficient reason refers human thinking beyond logic itself. The supervisor therefore 
should generate, amongst students, an awareness of the difference between reductionist 
and non-reductionist ontologies. Doctoral students must also realise that persistent themes 
and scientific revolutions go hand-in-hand.  Some examples of seeing the aspects of reality 
as modes of explanation are given, before the seven aims of scientific endeavors identified by 
Stafleu are stipulated. This constitutes another important guideline that ought to be taken into 
account in supervising post-graduate work. Argumentative skills, scientific communication 
and the status of facts are discussed before a concluding formulation is given in which the 
overall argument of the article is summarised.
© 2012. The Authors.
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Orientation
Supervision is the key element in transferring an academic culture of teaching, research and 
scholarly communication to subsequent generations – and in doing that both the university and 
the surrounding community benefit from this basic academic practice. Ultimately five interlinked 
constituents are involved in this dynamic process: the scholarly discipline, the supervisor, the 
student, the institution (university or technical university with their peculiar academic cultures) 
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Die ontwikkeling van ’n akademiese kultuur deur middel van studieleiding. Deur middel 
van effektiewe opvoedkundige oordrag word kulturele tradisies deurgegee aan opeenvolgende 
geslagte. Die teenwoordigheid van alternatiewe teoretiese siening van die werklikheid 
(paradigmas) in verskillende vakgebiede het die positivistiese oortuiging dat ‘egte’ wetenskap 
‘objektief’ en ‘neutraal’ is, ontwortel. Die agtergrond van hierdie seining gryp terug na die 
Renaissance en post-Renaissance filosofie wat sy aanvanklike kulminasiepunt in die denke van 
die 18de eeuse filosoof, Immanuel Kant, sou beleef. Hy wou die mens se outonome vryheid 
beveilig deur wetenskaplike denke tot verskynsels te beperk (onderworpe aan die universele 
kousaliteitswet). Die dialektiek tussen natuur en vryheid was rigtinggewend vir die moderne 
filosofie. Eventueel het nie-reduksionistiese oriëntasies verskyn wat erkenning verleen het 
aan dit wat onherleibaar is. Alhoewel ’n gesonde akademiese kultuur, wat in swang is by die 
begeleiding van doktorsgraadstudente, aandag moet gee aan argumentatiewe vaardighede en 
informele logika, moet dit tegelyk ook erkenning verleen aan die beperkinge van die logika. 
Die beginsel van toereikende grond verwys die menslike denke immers na dit wat die logika te 
bowe gaan. Die studiebegeleider moet daarom by die student ’n besef laat ontwikkel van wat 
die verskil tussen reduksionistiese en nie-reduksionistiese ontologieë is. Doktoraalstudente 
moet ook daarmee rekening hou dat duursame temas en wetenskaplike revolusies hand-aan-
hand gaan. Voorbeelde van hoe die aspekte van die werklikheid as verklaringsmodi gesien 
kan word is gegee alvorens die sewe doestellinge van wetenskaplik-besig-wees, soos deur 
Stafleu geïden tifiseer, aangestip is. Dit beliggaam nog ’n ander riglyn wat verreken behoort 
te word by die begeleiding van nagraadse werk. Daarom word argumentatiewe vaardighede, 
kommunikasie en die status van feite bespreek alvorens die hele artikel opgesom word in ’n 
samevattende formulering van die oorkoepelende argument.
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and society. However, in this article the primary focus will 
be on the academic discipline because it lies at the heart 
of an academic culture and because those involved in the 
process of doctoral studies, the supervisor and the student, 
are the custodians and stewards of such a discipline. If this 
stewardship is properly executed non-academic society will 
also benefit from its contribution.
Golde and Walker describe a steward of a discipline as 
a person who ‘thinks broadly about the entire span of the 
discipline and understands how its constituent parts fit 
together’ (Golde & Walker 2006:12). In this same volume 
Elkana points out that in the ‘natural sciences’ the doctorate is 
seemingly ‘in a much better shape than are the much-debated 
doctorates in the social sciences and the humanities.’ The 
emphasis on the word seemingly is connected to the view that 
apparently the natural sciences are ‘much less controversial’ 
than they were and their ‘objectives are less often questioned’ 
than they had been, because ‘the scientific community 
indulges in a greater sense of consensus than is the case in the 
professional communities in other areas of academe’ (Elkana 
2006). Yet, on the same page she continues:
Elsewhere in this volume, Catharine Stimpson tells us that the 
humanities are messy, pointing out the double sense of their 
messiness: turmoil, disorder on the one hand, and healthy 
complexity on the other. The same is true about the natural 
sciences. Just as in the humanities and the social sciences, 
there are no complete theories of anything in the sciences: the 
theoretical structures are far from complete; the foundations 
abound in internal contradictions and rapidly changing 
presuppositions. But whereas the social sciences and the 
humanities accept incompleteness and contra diction as a given, 
perhaps even welcome it, most of the natural sciences ignore it, 
claiming that incompleteness and the accompanying contradic-
tions do not affect the daily work of the scientist, neither in 
experimental work nor in theoretical deliberations, for they are 
considered unimportant passing phenomena—actually, mere 
noises—on the long and unin terrupted road toward certain and 
complete knowledge and Truth. (p. 67)
One of the leading mathematicians of the 20th century, 
Hermann Weyl, who switched from the axiomatic formalist 
school of David Hilbert and became a follower of the 
intuitionist, Brouwer, without hesitation confessed: ‘Like 
everybody and everything in the world today, we have our 
‘crisis.’ We have had it for nearly fifty years. Outwardly it 
does not seem to hamper our daily work, and yet I for one 
confess that it has had a considerable practical influence 
on my mathematical life: it directed my interests to fields I 
considered relatively ‘safe,’ and has been a constant drain on 
the enthusiasm and determination with which I pursued my 
research work’ (Weyl 1966:13).
These remarks are sufficient to show that the long-standing 
admiration of ‘universal reason’ did not succeed in avoiding 
diverging schools of thought (‘paradigms’) within the 
scholarly disciplines. At the same time it underscores the 
need for a sound academic culture supporting the doctorate 
student to come to terms with diverging paradigms.
However, it should be kept in mind that the acquisition of 
postgraduate academic qualifications explores one important 
detour towards the development from childhood to maturity. 
It is normally accomplished by advancing the establishment 
and expansion of scholarly knowledge practically relevant 
for all walks of life, and it pre-supposes the remarkable 
correlation between two unique phases within the 
ontogenetic growth pattern of human beings – something, 
for the first time, investigated by the Swiss biologist, 
Adolf Portmann. 
His empirical research is guided by the awareness of the fact 
that we are not certain about the phylogenies biologists talk 
about, but that we do have certainty about the natural system 
of currently living things. Instead of searching for similarities, 
Portmann rather investigates the differences between human 
beings and non-human living entities. According to this 
approach he characterises animals as Umweltgebunden 
[constrained by environment] and Instinktgesichert [protected 
by instinct] (Portmann 1990:79). In comparison with typical 
animal growth rhythms – which are gradual and continuous 
– the human growth rhythm displays two rapids, which are 
highlighted by a relatively long youth period running parallel 
with an accompanying long adult phase. These concurrent 
phases facilitate the effective educational transmission of a 
cultural legacy of millennia.
Portmann’s pioneering work in this field established that 
human beings cannot be pigeonholed in either of the 
two developmental types that one finds in the realm of 
animals (animal kingdom – Nesthocker and Nestflüchter),1 
which caused him to characterise human beings as follows: 
‘… human behavior may be termed open to the world 
[Weltoffen] and possessed of freedom of choice’ (Portmann 
1990:79).
This biotic developmental dynamic therefore shows that 
each period of development must be seen as fully embedded 
within the characteristic human form of life. Within the 
context of a differentiated human society this form of life 
also embraces educational and learning institutions like 
schools and universities. Within the latter supervising post-
graduate work occupies a modest but indispensible role in 
the continuation of our shared cultural legacy.
This article sets out to investigate some elements that ought to 
play a role in supervision within the context of the elements 
mentioned above. The significance of supervision will be 
situated within the requirements of a sound academic culture. 
Hence, we commence by looking at the importance of such 
an academic culture for supervision on the doctoral level.2
1.These Nesthocker (nest-huggers) and Nestflüchter (nest-leavers) are categorised 
in terms of independent criteria. The latter are animals which have a way of 
movement, stature and proportions at birth similar to their adult form, with open 
eyelids and hearing channels and little dependency on the parents. Nesthocker, on 
the other hand, are born in helpless dependence, with closed eyes and ears and 
dependent on care in a prepared nest. Where does the human being fit in? The 
human being is born with open eyes and ears – a Nestflüchter feature; the size and 
shape of its bodily parts are disproportional to the mature form – a Nesthocker 
feature; it has a long period of pregnancy – a Nestflüchter feature; it is helpless and 
dependent upon a prepared nest – a Nesthocker feature; its brain size increases 
with a factor of more than 5 – a Nestflüchter feature (the brain of the Nesthocker 
increases from birth to maturity with a factor of less than 5), and so on. The human 
being thus fits both and none of these two ontogenetic categories of Nestflüchter 
and Nesthocker – it represents a truly unique ontogenetic developmental pattern, 
found nowhere else amongst non-human living entities.
2.A brief characterisation of the similarities and differences between a Master’s 
dissertation and a PhD thesis is found in Lategan et al. (2005:74)
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Probing the spirit of our academic 
dispensation
A comprehensive understanding of the scholarly enterprise 
has to account for diverse and dominant scientific traditions 
within all the academic disciplines, embracing both the 
natural sciences and the humanities. Particularly during the 
20th century an increasing awareness of the foundational 
role of theoretical frameworks (‘paradigms’) emerged – 
eventually covered by the umbrella expression ‘philosophy 
of science.’
In particular, supervising PhD studies therefore ought to 
take foundational issues into account, because at this level 
scholarly maturity requires that the implicit starting-point of 
such doctoral studies must be made explicit. This requirement 
applies even if the actual study is not primarily directed at 
this field of the philosophy of science (i.e. the philosophical 
foundations of the discipline). For this reason, reaching 
the highest qualification within any academic discipline, 
ought to articulate one or another theoretical view of reality 
in confrontation with competing theoretical frameworks 
or paradigms.
Lesham rightly points at foundational questions, such as: 
‘What are the boundaries of your investigation?’ and ‘How 
would you explain your conceptual framework?’ (Lesham 
2007:288).
Any prospective doctoral student has to obtain a familiarity 
with the dominating paradigms of the discipline in which 
such a student is working. The first obstacle encountered 
when this task is undertaken presents itself in a quite familiar 
term, the word ‘science.’ In North America and Britain, in 
particular, it is customary to restrict science to the domain 
of physics. What is normally not realised is that this practice 
mainly derives from a particular philosophical tradition, 
known as positivism,3 although its roots go back to the 
Renaissance and the rise of the modern era.
According to positivism, science proper is based upon so-
called empirical observation, and experimentation – and for this 
reason it is objective and neutral. What is meant by empirical 
observation is that true science has to start from what could 
be experienced through the senses, that is, it proceeds on the 
basis of sensory perception and so-called sense data. From sense 
data, science is supposed to construe its concepts and derive its 
laws. What became known as the scientific method consisted in 
formulating hypotheses and in testing them (experimentally) 
in order to arrive at hypotheses which were supposed to 
turn into theories once they had been successfully ‘verified’ 
(eventually it was said that they were to be ‘confirmed’). 
Given this strict delimitation of science there was a need to 
contemplate what falls outside this domain, in other words 
a demarcation problem emerged. Wallner phrases this issue 
as follows: ‘It was always attempted anew to set limits to 
science, in order not to give up what is typically human’ 
(Wallner 1992:63).
3.Positivism is also called logical-empirism, dominant in the philosophy of science 
during a large part of the 20th century.
Although this formulation of the problem may sound 
extremely innocent, its historical roots testify to the contrary. 
Going back to Immanuel Kant, the influential 18th century 
Enlightenment philosopher, opens a view on an intellectual 
tradition in which the rational capacities of the human being 
were highly regarded and eventually became triumphant 
in a rationalistic thought climate, such as the one found in 
the 18th century. In fact the underlying motivation of what 
surfaced within this Enlightenment era cannot be understood 
apart from the intellectual history of the preceding centuries. 
Initiated by the Renaissance, modern philosophy, during the 
14th and 15th centuries, witnessed the rise of the ideal of an 
all-encompassing natural science (mathematics and physics) 
on the one hand, and the ideal of an autonomously free 
human person on the other.
Since Descartes (1596–1650), the ideal of such an encompassing 
natural scientific control of all reality started to dominate the 
scene. In order to proclaim its autonomy (being a law unto 
itself), and through this its freedom, the human person had to 
master reality with the aid of the newly developing natural 
sciences. In this way what became known as the personality 
ideal gave rise to the science-ideal.
In the mould of this new spiritual climate, the ‘world’ no 
longer embraces the human being. Rather, the world is 
now recovered as an object which is subject to the control 
of the autonomously free rational human being with its all-
determining natural scientific abilities. Husserl (1856−1938) 
refers to this as the rationalistic science ideal since Galileo 
(Husserl 1954:64ff., 119), and Dooyeweerd, in a similar 
fashion, speaks of the modern humanistic science ideal in its 
opposition to the humanistic personality ideal (nature versus 
freedom). The basic motive of modern Humanism is indeed 
that of nature (science ideal) and freedom (personality ideal) 
(cf. Dooyeweerd 1997−II:215ff.).
Because this is the motive directing our Western intellectual 
culture during the past 500 years, it is important that every 
supervisor and every doctoral student, in whatever discipline, 
has a basic understanding of the way in which this dialectical 
motive developed. This understanding should commence 
with the rationalism of Descartes, and follow its path until 
the long-standing rationalistic tradition is replaced by the 
irrationalism and relativism of postmodernity. Probing the 
way in which this dialectic permeated the various academic 
disciplines (both the natural sciences and the humanities) 
will enhance the intellectual level of the debate.
Reductionism
The striking shared feature of the developing academic 
disciplines is that both the natural sciences and the 
humanities were constantly characterised by diverging 
theoretical orientations, including mathematics,4 physics and 
4.In respect of mathematics Beth remarks: ‘It is clear that intuitionistic mathematics 
is not merely that part of classical mathematics which would remain if one removed 
certain methods not acceptable to the intuitionists. On the contrary, intuitionistic 
mathematics replaces those methods by other ones that lead to results which find 
no counterpart in classical mathematics’ (Beth 1965:89).
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even derived (or: applied) disciplines, such as engineering5 
and medicine6). The founder of modern (20th century) 
intuitionism, L.E.J. Brouwer (1964), spells out this ‘difference 
in standpoint’ with unambiguous clarity:
As a matter of course the languages of the two mathematical 
schools also diverge. And even in those mathematical theories 
which are covered by a neutral language, that is by a language 
understandable on both sides, each school operates with 
mathematical entities not recognized by the other one: there are 
intuitionist structures which cannot be fitted into any classical 
logical frame, and there are classical arguments not applicable 
to any intro spective image. Likewise, in the theories mentioned, 
mathematical entities recognized by both parties on each side are 
found to contain satisfying theorems which for the other school 
are either false, or senseless, or even in a way contradictory. In 
particular, theorems based in intuitionism, but not in classical 
mathematics, often originate from the circumstance that 
for mathematical entities belonging to a certain species, the 
possession of a certain property imposes a special character on 
their way of development from the basic intuition, and that from 
this special character of their way of development from the basic 
intuition, properties ensue which for classical mathematics are 
false. A striking example is the intuitionist theorem that a full 
function of the unity continuum, that is a function assigning a 
real number to every non-negative real number not exceeding 
unity, is necessarily uniformly continuous. (p. 79)
This factual state of affairs fundamentally challenges the 
positivistic ideal of objectivity and neutrality. Moreover, 
these philosophically founded schools of thought within 
the disciplines are more often than not entangled in what 
should be labelled reductionism in a pejorative sense. Popper 
is unambiguous in his rejection of reductionism. Consistent 
with his view he holds: ‘As a philosophy, reductionism is a 
failure’ (Popper 1974:269). Goodfield (1974) gives a balanced 
assessment:
Reductionist methodology may have been extremely successful, 
but the history of science abounds with examples where forms 
of explanation, successful in one field, have turned out to be 
disastrous when imported into another. (p. 86)
A positive appreciation of reduction is, for example, found 
in the thought of Dawkins and Dennett (see Dennet 1995:80 
ff). Surely there are also positive and largely unrelated 
connotations attached to the term reduction in different 
special sciences. For example, mathematicians may speak 
of the construction of numbers from sets and then designate 
it as ‘reduction’. Separating chemical compounds into their 
simpler constituents is also known as ‘reduction’, and so on. 
We shall see that the idea of irreducibility precludes every 
5.The most prominent negative influence on engineering is found in the pervasive 
force of technicism in modern Western society. The well-known Dutch philosopher 
of technology, Egbert Schuurman, analyses the nature and shortcomings of 
technicism surrounding modern technology (Schuurman 1993, 1995, 2005 & 2009).
6.A reductionist anatomical view of the human spine, linking it to our supposed 
quadruped ancestors, is an example of a medical practice in the grip of reductionism. 
Richard William Porter, who was the Director of Education and Training for the Royal 
College of Surgeons of Edinburgh, was mainly interested in spine and osteoporosis 
research (he is the author of many books and over 100 peer-reviewed articles). One 
of his merits is that he highlighted the fact that the assumed ‘early’ quadruped 
phase of human beings led to therapeutic practices for reducing lordosis which 
worsened the problem. Sarfati concludes: ‘Evolutionary notions of bad design in the 
human spine have impeded the development of appropriate treatments for injured 
backs’ (Sarfati 2010:282).
reductionist approach. The only meaningful option is to 
investigate the interconnections of what is irreducible. The 
challenge to all scholarship is to understand the coherence of 
irreducibles – or more strongly formulated: to understand in 
terms of the coherence of irreducibles! Whoever wants to avoid 
the reduction of what is irreducible opts for what ought to be 
designated as a non-reductionist ontology. 7
In order to capture more problematic situations the term 
reductionism had emerged by the middle of the 20th century. 
In 1953 Quine used it in his discussion of ‘The Verification 
Theory and Reductionism’ (see Quine 1953:37ff) and in the 
early seventies the work ‘Beyond Reductionism’ appeared 
(see Koestler & Smythies 1972). In this work, Smith considers 
the scientist-philosopher Michael Polanyi to be ‘perhaps the 
severest and most comprehensive critic of reductionism’ 
because he ‘was a major scientist of this century and was 
drawn into philosophical debate primarily because of the 
threat to scientific freedom, political democracy, and to 
humane values that he saw in reductionism.’ To this Smith 
(1994) adds the remark: 
His works The Contempt of Freedom, The Logic of Liberty, Science 
Faith and Society, Personal Knowledge, and The Tacit Dimension 
have as a common theme the criticism of reductionism in all its 
scientific, cultural and moral forms. (n.p.)
Compare the remarks of G.L. Smith, ‘On Reductionism.’8 
Putnam holds that scientism and relativism are reductionist 
theories (Putnam 1982:126). In respect of ‘phenomenalism’ he 
remarks:
the idea that the statements of science are translatable one by 
one into statements about what experiences we will have 
if we perform certain actions has now been given up as an 
unacceptable kind of reductionism. (Putnam 1982:187)
Logical validity and truth
From an epistemological perspective another intrinsic 
consideration supports a non-reductionist approach. Logic as 
such, in its concern for the validity of arguments, has to accept 
the logical principles of identity and non-contradiction. 
However, these two principles merely enable one to realise 
that two contradictory statements cannot both be true in 
the same logical context. In order to establish the truth of a 
statement other logical principles are needed, first of all the 
principle of the excluded middle.9
It is generally accepted that the validity of an argument ought 
to be distinguished from its truth. This convinced many 
scholars that there is a world of ‘pure thinking,’ stripped of 
any connections with the ‘outer world.’ Both predicate logic 
and propositional (formal) logic seem to operate only on the 
7.Be therefore aware of the difference between ‘reduction’ and ‘reductionism’, that 
is the absolutisation of reduction. Reduction is a valid and fruitful scientific method 
(e.g., the rendering of physical states of affairs in mathematical terms). Reductionism 
believes that explanation consists of reduction only. See the reference to the view 
of Margenau below.
8.See also Heitler (1972:60).
9.This principle concerns the case where the totality of what can be analysed is divided 
such that any statement either belongs to the one or the other part – there is no 
third option (Latin: tertium non datur). Already Aristotle understood the principle of 
the excluded middle (see Metaph. 1057a – see Aristotle 2001:845−846).
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basis of the logical principles of identity, (non-)contra diction 
and the excluded middle. For example, if one looks at the 
deductive syllogism in its four modes, whilst considering 
that there are four kinds of propositions involved – universal 
affirmative [A] and universal negative [E]; particular 
affirmative [I] and particular negative [O] – and then asks 
two questions: 
1. how many inference patterns are there? 
2. how many of these constitute valid inferences? – then it is 
clear that, of the 256 possibilities, only a limited number 
are valid (p. 21). 
In order to differentiate between valid and invalid inferences, 
an implicit or explicit use of the logical principles of identity 
and non-contradiction is required. Only on this basis is it 
possible to evaluate a particular inference as being logically 
sound or illogical. But this constitutes a normative contrary 
– only human beings with an accountably free will are 
able to act in conformity with logical principles or violate 
such principles. Also, the domain of propositional logic 
presupposes the said logical principles.
The entire distinction between subject and predicate – in 
its logical sense – is dependent upon the nature of concepts. 
Predicates normally explicate (logically identified and 
distinguished) traits brought together in the unity of a 
concept. Any property which is excluded from this logical 
unity of the concept cannot be predicated of it afterwards, 
except in an illogical way. If it were true that the concept 
‘(material) body’ excludes the property of weight [mass] 
to begin with – as Immanuel Kant asserts in his Critique of 
Pure Reason (1787, B:10ff) – then the so-called ‘synthetic’ 
proposition: ‘all bodies are heavy’ would be illogical because 
it violates the principle of non-contradiction.10
Nuanced theories
The claim that reductionism is unwarranted implicitly 
presupposes the conviction that ‘irreducibles’ and ‘primitives’ 
exist. Typical (reductionist) all-claims, such as that everything 
is number (the Pythagoreans), or everything is interpretation 
(postmodernism), challenge the idea of uniqueness and 
irreducibility. All-claims like these are mainly monistic 
in nature – in the sense that they want to find one single, 
all-encompassing perspective or principle of explanation 
capable of accounting for the entire diversity manifest in 
our experience of the universe. With reference to Einstein’s 
thirty-year search for a unified field theory, Brian Greene, a 
specialist in the theory of Super Strings, for example, believes 
that physicists will find (have found) a framework fitting 
their insights into a ‘seamless whole,’ a ‘single theory that, 
in principle, is capable of describing all phenomena’ (Greene 
2003:viii). He introduces Super String theory as the ‘Unified 
Theory of Everything’ (Greene 2003:15; see also pp. 364−370, 
385−386).
A mere look at the terms used in Greene’s claim shows that 
its formulation exceeds the confines of a purely physical 
10.It is therefore significant that the prominent German logicians of the 19th century 
eventually turned this proposition into an ‘analytic’ statement (Lotze, Windelband, 
Sigwart).
perspective. Any physical theory, for that matter, is inevitably 
dependent upon non-physical terms – an insight that applies 
to all the academic disciplines. In Greene’s remark the whole-
parts relation features – he speaks of a ‘seamless whole.’ 
However, this relation finds its original ‘seat’ within the spatial 
aspect, for the core meaning of space – continuous extension 
– entails that in order to be continuous all the extended parts 
must be connected in the sense of cohering with each other. 
Yet, when all the parts are given, the whole is given as well, 
showing that continuous extension is simply synonymous 
with the whole-parts relation (see Strauss, 2009a:40ff; & 
Strauss 2009b:60−61, 224−225, 239−240, 353−355, 306−307, 
406−408). 
But perhaps the best argument in support of a non-reductionist 
ontology flows from the universal presence of primitive terms 
in all disciplines. Semantics, as a sub-discipline of general 
linguistics, had to accept ‘meaning’ as such as a primitive 
term. Similarly axiomatic set theory also had to accept 
primitive terms. For example, within Zermelo-Fraenkel set 
theory, ‘member of’11 is introduced as a primitive term – and 
Gödel once remarked that as yet we do not have a satisfactory 
non-circular definition of the term set.12 Within set theory the 
primitive meaning of both number and space is therefore 
quite evident, for the multiplicity (number) of ‘members’ 
which are considered to be united into a whole. Our remark 
above, namely that continuous extension is synonymous 
to the whole-parts relation and the notion of coherence, is 
supported by a statement from Shapiro: ‘coherence is not 
a rigorously defined mathematical notion, and there is no 
noncircular way to characterize it’ (Shapiro 2000:13).
The acknowledgement of ‘primitive terms’ in connection 
with uniqueness and coherence highlights one element of 
the mentioned problem regarding the coherence of irreducibles. 
Gödel understood this issue in his own way. Yourgrau 
explains that he ‘insisted that to know the primitive concepts, 
one must not only understand their relationships to the other 
primitives but must grasp them on their own, by a kind of 
‘intuition’ (Yourgrau 2005:169). On the next page he adds that 
‘the fundamental concepts are primitive and their meaning is 
not exhausted by their relationships to other concepts.’
An argument in favour of the acknowledgement of 
irreducibility – as one side of the coin (with the mutual 
coherence of what is unique as the other side) – ought to show 
that an unwarranted reductionism is entangled in unsolved 
problems (normally referred to as contradictions, paradoxes 
or antinomies). We mentioned that Margenau defended a 
‘moderate reductionism’ by pursuing the strategy consisting 
of reducing whatever can be reduced, without however 
11.See also the remark of Penelope, where she points out that within first order 
logic membership (ε) is ‘its only non-logical symbol’ (Penelope 2000:50). Whereas 
mathematical logic needs something non-logical, we have noted that likewise any 
physical theory is also in need of non-physical terms.
12.‘The operation ‘set of x’sʹ (where the variable ‘xʹ ranges over some given kind 
of objects) cannot be defined satisfactorily (at least not in the present state of 
knowledge), but can only be paraphrased by other expressions involving again the 
concept of set, such as: ‘multitude of x’sʹ, ‘combination of any number of x’sʹ, ‘part 
of the totality of x’sʹ, where a ‘multitudeʹ (‘combinationʹ, ‘partʹ) is conceived as 
something that exists in itself, no matter whether or not we can define it in a finite 
number of words (so that random sets are not excluded)ʹ (Gödel 1964:262).
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ignoring emergence or persisting in reducing the irreducible’ 
(cf. Margenau 1982:187, 196−197).
Ernst Cassirer, the philosopher from the neo-Kantian 
Marburg school (perhaps best known for his three volume 
work Philosophy of Symbolic Forms), is also explicit in this 
regard when he claims that a critical analysis of knowledge, 
in order to avoid a regressus in infinitum, has to accept certain 
basic functions that are not capable of being ‘deduced’ and 
not in need of a deduction (see Cassirer 1957:73).
This insight enabled us to connect the inevitable employment 
of such basic (and irreducible) concepts to the indefinable 
meaning-nuclei of the different (irreducible) modal aspects. 
Precisely because these concepts are basic, they cannot be 
defined straight away. Various disciplines acknowledge this 
state of affairs by explicitly introducing ‘primitive terms.’
 
The inevitability of primitive terms, in their connection with 
the issue of the ‘coherence of irreducibles,’ at once also entails 
a fundamental criticism of the positivist program attempting 
to reduce knowledge to sense-data.
The implication of the issue regarding the coherence of 
irreducibles underscores the importance for research within 
all the disciplines not to fall short of an acknowledgement of 
the radical diversity within reality and a nuanced theoretical 
account of this diversity. At the same time it liberates us from 
the out-dated positivistic philosophy.
The impasse of positivism
What positivism did not realise is that sensory perception 
primarily relates to things and events, that is to say, to the 
concrete what of experience, but that it does not give access to 
the (primitive) terms employed in describing the how of what 
has been observed. These terms, to be sure, stem from the 
various functional (modal) aspects of reality and these modal 
functions, as such, are never open to sensory perception. 
Nonetheless these aspects do provide theoretical thinking 
with modal terms (aspectual terms) that are indispensable for 
the formation of scientific concepts and theories. As soon as 
the inevitability of employing modal terms is acknowledged, 
the Achilles’ heel of positivism is laid bare (see Strauss 2003). 
For example, the history of the concept of matter successively 
explored different modes of explanation – starting with the 
perspective of number and then proceeding to the aspect of 
space, the kinematic aspect and eventually the physical aspect 
of reality. The key question is whether or not these modal 
aspects could be observed in a sensory way. Can they be 
weighed, touched, measured or smelled? (see Strauss 2006a). 
Heitler refers to the Schrödinger wave-function which, 
according to him, cannot be observed in its mathematical 
existence, even though it is the instrument through which 
assertions about observable properties can be made 
(Heitler 1972:62).
We may add that in the formation of physical theories, it 
is never the case that a particular theoretical statement, as 
such, is confronted directly with a single sensory experience. 
The above-mentioned formidable mathematician, Hermann 
Weyl, subscribes to the conception of Hugo Dingler in 
viewing physical theories in terms of what is called the 
principle of symbolical construction. Weyl (1966) holds the 
following view:
[That the] constructive character of the natural sciences, the 
situation that their individual propositions do not have a 
verifiable meaning in intuition (Anschauung), but that truth 
builds a system which can only as a whole be assessed. (p. 192)
Max Planck states a similar perspective in a concise 
way: Strictly seen it is totally impossible to find any 
physical question which can be assessed directly through 
measurements without the aid of a theory (Planck 1973:341).
Although Popper is sometimes associated with positivism, 
he considers himself a major figure in causing the death of 
positivism. One of his main concerns was also the problem 
of demarcation, given in the question: is it possible to elevate 
the isolated domain of ‘science’ to be the sole source of 
reliable knowledge of reality, or is it rather the case that even 
science, as such, is dependent upon assumptions that cannot 
be ‘verified’ by science itself? As it turned out, this question 
intimately coheres with the problem of induction (i.e. the 
nature of generalisations): is it possible to obtain knowledge 
with a claim to universality merely by investigating a limited 
number of instances?
Hacohen points out that Popper ‘sought to overcome the gap 
the Wiener Kreis had opened between science and philosophy’ 
(Hacohen 2002:195). By attempting this, Popper once again 
opened the avenue to historical perspectives, because there is 
no single discipline (special science) which does not, in one 
or another way, mirror within its own confines the successive 
trends manifested in the history of philosophy. At the same 
time these trends of thought are themselves interrelated in a 
twofold way. First of all they share an appeal to certain states 
of affairs within reality, and secondly they all respond, albeit 
in different ways, to these states of affairs.
Persistent themes and scientific 
revolutions
Suppose we consider the definition of any special science – 
and then scrutinise it in terms of the difference between what 
is (ontically) given and how we responded to it. Theology 
is sometimes considered to consist of different groups 
of subjects, such as the dogmatological, ecclesiological, 
and bibliological groups. Yet identifying these groups of 
academic sub-disciplines does not clearly say what is studied 
by theology – it rather tells us something about the (sub-)
disciplines involved in studying whatever it may be. Likewise, 
if one says that mathematics is set theory or is constituted 
by algebra and topology, merely the ‘response-side’ surfaces 
whilst the persistent, underlying ontic side is neglected. If we 
define a discipline in terms of what is currently practiced by 
those who are working within the discipline, our definition 
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is, by definition, historically dated. Surely, it is meaningless to 
say that Greek mathematics or Fermat, Bernoulli or Cauchy 
researched set theory. Therefore, in terms of the definition 
that mathematics is set theory, these thinkers were not 
mathematicians.
The alternative is to account for those aspects of reality 
delimiting the field of investigation of the various academic 
disciplines. Then it is quite easy to realise that mathematics, 
for example, has been concerned with the nature of number 
and space since its very inception (or discreteness and 
continuity).13 Likewise, in spite of different theoretical 
stances in respect of material things throughout the history 
of physics, the varying historical theories never succeeded 
in moving away from the kinematic and physical aspects 
of reality.
By combining the focus of Kuhn (1970) on scientific 
revolutions with Holton’s emphasis on persistent themes, it 
becomes easier to maintain both perspectives at once – and 
this should be a challenge to the supervisor and doctoral 
student within every academic discipline. However, Holton 
points out that ‘for every thematic informed theory used 
in any science there may also be found a theory using the 
opposite thema, or antithema’. Holton (1988) mentions the 
current search for: 
‘the constituents of ‘elementary particles’ … a pursuit that has 
made sense to scientists all the way back to Thales. It is nothing 
less than an a priori commitment that deserves to be called 
thematic’ (p. 14) 
It is clear that the underlying ontic conditions at stake are 
different from an a priori thematic commitment. What is 
actually required is discerning the ontic features of reality 
making possible all kinds of thematic commitments.
In the case of the mathematical meaning of number and 
space – always associated with our awareness of the 
primitive meaning of discreteness and continuity – it should 
indeed be understood that the ontic conditions making 
possible theoretical approaches in which it is attempted 
either to explain physical reality (matter) exclusively in terms 
of discreteness (‘particles’) or purely in terms of continuity 
(field theories), are not the product of theoretical reflection. 
It is clear that this distinction between atomism and continuity 
is based upon number and space as the two most basic 
modes of explanation of reality. In the attempt to understand 
matter, according to Stegmüller, also other unique modes of 
explanation surfaced (Stegmüller 1987): 
1. the apparent indestructibility of matter.
2. the apparent or real limitless transformability of matter. 
(p. 91)
These two points highlight a theme known since early Greek 
philosophy – the relationship between constancy and change. 
Holton (1988) writes: 
Since Parmenides and Heraclitus, the members of the thematic 
dyad of constancy and change have vied their loyalty, and 
13.‘Bridging the gap between the domains of discreteness and continuity, or between 
arithmetic and geometry, is a central, ‘presumably even the central problem of the 
foundations of mathematics (Fraenkel et al. 1973:211).
to have, even since, Pythagoras and Thales, the efficacy of 
mathematics versus the efficacy of materialistic or mechanistic 
models. (p. 17)
When these last-mentioned problems are assessed in their 
coherence, it is immediately clear that they depend upon 
the third and fourth ontic modes of explanation in reality, 
namely the meaning of kinematic persistence (‘immutability’) 
and physical changefulness (‘transformability’).
Persistent themes are imbedded within scholarly paradigms 
or theoretical views of reality, sometimes also designated as 
conceptual frameworks.14 Although explaining in sufficient 
detail what is really entailed in a theoretical framework 
exceeds the scope of this article, it should be noted that the 
complexity and reach of such a theoretical paradigm should 
encompass not only the elementary basic concepts of a discipline, 
but also the compound and typical concepts.15 The remark 
quoted by Lesham, namely that in a workshop students had 
‘to define’ their conceptual frameworks ‘in a single sentence’ 
(Lesham 2007:292) does reflect a fairly reduced understanding 
of the nature of a theoretical framework. A much better 
account of these issues is found in two publications made 
available under the editorship of Lategan (see Lategan 
& Lues, 2005 & Lategan, Hey, Holtzhausen, Truscott, & 
Vermeulen 2005). In these works a clear understanding of 
what is advocated in this article is found, even though more 
detailed arguments are currently advanced. Our aim is to 
take these issues a step further. The current literature within 
the field of higher education may benefit from the thrust of 
our current analyses because as such they are not articulated 
within it.
The aims of science
In his work of the foundation of physics Stafleu (1980) 
discerns seven aims of scientific endeavours:
1. the explication of laws
2. the reduction and deduction of laws
3. abstraction or analysis
4. reconstruction or synthesis of typical laws16
5. identifying modal aspects (modes of explanation and 
relatedness) and exploring their backward and forward 
point connections with other aspects
6. objectification
7. explaining individual facts and phenomena. (pp. 8−29)
In the light of the foregoing considerations regarding 
theoretical views of reality – in their relation to the coherence 
of what is unique, and the other issues pertaining to a non-
14.Because the significant Report, The PhD Study, An Evidence-based Study on how 
to meet the Demands of High-level Skills in an Emerging Economy (Jonathan 2010) 
does not explicitly enter into an analysis of the role of theoretical paradigms on 
the doctoral level, our current suggestions should be seen as aimed at further 
exploring the starting-points provided in this Report. In the Report itself the word 
paradigm and the phrase conceptual framework are both just briefly mentioned 
(twice, to be precise).
15.Compare Strauss 2006a:125−270.
16.‘Whereas typical laws can usually be found by induction and generalisation 
of empirical facts or lower level law statements, modal laws are found by 
abstraction. Euclidean geometry, Galileo’s discovery of the laws of motion … and 
thermodynamic laws are all examples of laws found by abstraction. This state of 
affairs is reflected in the use of the term ‘rational mechanics,’ in distinction from 
experimental physics’ (Stafleu 1980:11).
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reductionist ontology – the task and role of a supervisor is 
not simple at all. The positivistic ideal of the objectivity and 
neutrality of scholarly activities is currently out-dated – this 
is also the case within the domain of mathematics. Consider 
the title of a book written by Kline (1980): Mathematics, The 
Loss of Certainty, and note that the mathematician Hersh 
also questions the supposed infallibility and objectivity of 
mathematics (see Hersh 1997, Part One, Chapter 3, pp. 35−47).
Argumentative skills
Within the process of supervising it is fundamental that 
the student should implement argumentative skills. An 
acquaintance with informal logic is basic. Suppose, for 
example, an academic concerned about crime and the legal 
system in South Africa makes the following statement in a 
class: ‘You are all too bright to reject capital punishment!’
This statement first of all appeals to the intelligence (being 
‘bright’) of the students without putting forward an 
argument either in favour or against capital punishment 
(within informal logic this is called an argument ad hominem). 
In the second place it refers to a widely held negative attitude 
towards not applying capital punishment without justifying 
this negative attitude [argumentum ad invidiam]. The third 
fallacy is seen in the attempt to persuade the students on 
the basis of flattery – crediting them with the quality of 
being ‘bright,’ once again without advancing any positive 
or negative argument for or against capital punishment 
[argumentum ad captandum]. Finally the statement contains a 
variant of the ad populum fallacy (directed towards a general 
sentiment, empathy or fear), in this case specifically directed 
towards the personal fear of students who may be afraid 
of being seen as non-intelligent by their lecturer or fellow 
students [argumentum ad baculum].17
Furthermore, one of the popular slogans of contemporary 
academic institutions is found in the idea that scholars 
(lecturers and students) ought to be critical. This ideal of 
critical thinking is uncritically repeated in many contexts – 
uncritically because one is never informed about the criteria 
that are to be applied whilst engaging in ‘critical thinking’!
We have observed that two contradictory statements cannot 
both be true at the same time and in the same circumstances. 
However, in order to decide which one is true logic as such 
falls short. That truth is more than merely a logical issue was 
for the first time clearly seen by Leibniz in his formulation of 
the principium rationis sufficientis. This refers thinking beyond 
the limits of pure logicality. Ultimately all the mentioned 
logical principles rest on the basis of the ontic principle of the 
excluded antinomy. The latter principle brings to expression 
the irreducibility of what is unique – entailing that whenever 
an attempt is made to reduce any modal aspect to a different 
one, theoretical thought will inevitably be caught up in 
insurmountable antinomies.
17.The habit of saying that we have many choices confuses choice with options: we 
normally have many options, but just one choice at a time.
Therefore the logical principle of non-contradiction is 
founded in this underlying ontic principle, namely the 
principle that forbids reducing one modal aspect to another 
one (see Dooyeweerd 1997–II: 36 ff.). This principle is ontic in 
nature and should be called the principium exclusae antinomiae.
The above-mentioned perennial philosophical problem of 
explaining the coherence of what is unique and irreducible 
(the coherence of irreducibles) therefore opens the way to 
an acknowledgment of the foundational position of the 
principium exclusae antinomiae in respect of the logical principle 
of non-contradiction – and at once explains why the distinction 
between antinomy and contradiction is not purely logical in 
nature. The principium exclusae antinomiae not only depicts 
the limits of logic, but also underscores the significance 
of a non-reductionist ontology transcending the confines 
of logic. Ontological reductionism violates the principium 
exclusae antinomiae and it leads to disastrous consequences, 
entailing all kinds of logical contradictions. Even if we 
disregard possible underlying antinomies, a negation of the 
principle of non-contradiction is equally devastating. Hersh 
remarks: ‘From any contradiction, all propositions (and their 
negations) follow! Everything’s both true and false! The 
theory collapses in ruins’ (Hersh 1997:31).
Zeno’s argument: ‘Something moving neither moves in 
the space it occupies, nor in the space it does not occupy’ 
(Diels & Kranz 1959–1960, B Fr.3), is antinomic. It concerns 
a clash of irreducible laws. When a moving body is, at every 
moment of its ‘movement,’ in one specific place, it appears to 
be at rest, because ‘being in one place’ simply means ‘not being 
in motion.’18 An antinomy emerges as soon as theoretical 
thought confuses what is ontically unique and irreducible. 
The attempt to explain movement in terms of space therefore 
results in a (theoretical) conflict between kinematic laws of 
motion and spatial laws. Stafleu suggests that one way to 
interpret Zeno’s arguments ‘against’ motion is that he in fact 
demonstrates that motion cannot be explained by numerical 
and spatial relations (see Stafleu 1987:61). The same applies to 
the classical school in economics which attempted to reduce 
economic life to a physical equilibrium, as if economic life 
is governed by natural laws instead of economic principles, 
making possible the contrary: economic – un-economic.19 The 
possibility of conforming to or contradicting principles, that 
is to say, to act in norm-violating or norm-conformative ways, 
presupposes an accountable will with freedom of choice. 
It should therefore not be surprising that the naturalistic 
assumptions of Darwinism are spelled out explicitly by 
Dawkins (1996) when he categorically assumes an antinomic 
position that opposes any form of normed accountablity:
… if the universe were just electrons and selfish genes, …, [It] 
would manifest no intentions of any kind. In a universe of blind 
physical forces and genetic replication … [S]uch a universe 
would be neither evil nor good. … The universe we observe has 
18.However, in a letter to Moritz Schlick (07 June 1920) Einstein writes: ‘Rest is a dynamic 
event in which the velocities are constantly zero, one that for our consideration is, in 
principle, equivalent to any other event of motion’ (Einstein 2006:186).
19.Within the discipline of economics Milton Friedman and Von Hayek are well-known 
defenders of the classical school of Adam Smith and the free-market capitalism 
entailed by it. It was superseded by the neoclassical approach (from Cournot 
and Dupuit to Menger, Jevons, Walras and Pareto), the marginalism of Marshall 
and Keynes‘s ‘General Theory’ as well as alternative approaches to competition 
(Chamberlin and Robinson).
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precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, 
no design, no purpose, no evil and no good, nothing but blind, 
pitiless indifference. (p. 155)
In this sense antinomies therefore concern an inter-modal 
confusion, that is, a lack of distinguishing properly between 
different modes, functions or aspects of reality. The illogical 
concept of a square circle merely confuses two spatial figures 
– residing within the spatial aspect. A contradiction like this 
is intra-modal and therefore different from an antinomy 
which is inter-modal in nature.
The alternative to (antinomic) reductionism is given in an 
analysis of inter-modal connections presupposing their 
irreducibility. One of the richest implications enclosed in 
such an analysis is the fact that it is possible to come to a 
theoretical articulation of modal norms on the basis of 
analysing analogies (retro and anticipations) on the norm 
side of the normative aspects of reality.
Scientific communication and ‘facts’
One of the main challenges for supervision is to educate 
scholars to be able to communicate effectively with 
alternative and even opposing points of view. At the most 
basic level this involves the presence of informal fallacies. Then 
one may exercise immanent criticism by looking at internal 
inconsistencies (contradictions) by bringing into play the 
logical principle of non-contradiction and, if applicable, 
the principle of the excluded middle. Subsequently, a 
scientific position may be tested by applying the principle 
of sufficient reason (ground), which may lead to the exercise 
of factual criticism. Only after this has been accomplished is 
it meaningful to formulate an alternative point of view, for 
otherwise, that is, without factual and immanent criticism, 
a scholarly interaction (discussion) easily terminates in the 
proverbial: ‘I say this and you say that, so what?’
It should be kept in mind, however, that the philosophy of 
science during the 20th century transcended the positivistic 
notion of ‘brute facts.’ Facts are structured, they occur within 
an ontic order – for this reason an arithmetical fact (2 + 2 = 4) 
differs from a geometrical fact (2 + 2 = √8 – it represents 
a vector sum), and so on. Because scholarship employs a 
theoretical framework in order to account for factual states of 
affairs even observation is said to be ‘theory-laden.’
Look for example at the expectation Darwin (1859) had 
concerning ‘numerous, fine, intermediate varieties’ breaking 
‘down the distinction between species’: 
Geological research, …, yet has done scarcely anything in 
breaking down the distinction between species, by connecting 
them together by numerous, fine, intermediate varieties; and 
this not having been affected, is probably the greatest and most 
obvious of all the many objections which may be urged against 
my views. (p. 307)
However, with reference to invertebrate animals, Dawkins 
(1987) says:
And we find many of them already in an advanced state of 
evolution the very first time they appear. It is though they were 
just planted there, without any evolutionary history. (p. 229)
Stark refers to Gould: ‘The extreme rarity of transitional forms 
in the fossil record (the professional secret of paleontologists) 
is the most prominent problem for Darwinism’ (quoted 
by Van den Beukel 2005:105). According to Gould and 
Eldredge (1977) stasis (constancy) is the dominant pattern in 
paleontology:
The extreme rarity of transitional forms in the fossil record 
persists as the trade secret of paleontology. The evolutionary 
trees that adorn our textbooks have data only at the tips and 
nodes of their branches; the rest is inference, however reasonable, 
not evidence of fossils. (p. 14)
More recently Gould (2002) states:
The fossil record may, after all, be 99 percent imperfect, but if 
you can, nonetheless, sample a species at a large number of 
horizons well spread over several million years, and if these 
samples record no net change, with beginning and end points 
substantially the same, and with only mild and errant fluctuation 
among the numerous collections in between, then a conclusion of 
stasis rests on the presence of data, not on absence! In such cases, 
we must limit our lament about imperfection to a wry observation 
that nature, rather than human design, has established a sampling 
scheme by providing only occasional snapshots over a full interval. 
We might have preferred a more even temporal spacing of these 
snapshots, but so long as our samples span the temporal range 
of a species, with reasonable representation throughout, why 
grouse at nature’s failure to match optimal experimental design 
– when she has, in fact, been very kind to us in supplying 
abundant information. Stasis is data. (p. 759)
When a ‘gradualist’ has to account for a new fossil, the 
Darwinian prejudice will position it in a line of slow, 
incremental change even though there are not fossils available 
to substantiate this interpretation. Gould, by contrast, will 
appreciate such a finding in terms of the dominant pattern of 
the fossil record: stasis.
On the same page Gould (2002) continues:
So if stasis could not be explained away as missing information, 
how could gradualism face this most prominent signal from 
the fossil record? The most negative of all strategies – a quite 
unconscious conspiracy of silence – dictated the canonical 
response of paleontologists to their observations of stasis. Again, 
a ‘culprit’ may be identified in the ineluctable embedding of 
observation within theory. (p. 759)
And then he makes a statement regarding facts which shows 
that he has ‘digested’ the thrust of the philosophy of science 
of the second half of the 20th century (Kuhn, Feyerabend, 
Lakatos, Stegmüller, Toulmin and others):
Facts have no independent existence in science, or in any 
human endeavor; theories grant differing weights, values, 
and descriptions, even to the most empirical and undeniable 
of observations. Darwin’s expectations defined evolution as 
gradual change. Generations of paleontologists learned to 
equate the potential documentation of evolution with the 
discovery of insensible intermediacy in a sequence of fossils. In 
this context, stasis can only record sorrow and disappointment. 
(Gould 2002:759)
By contrast, within the tradition of reformational philosophy 
stasis is acknowledged and seen as pointing towards the 
order-diversity within creation – appreciated as being 
informed by the biblical life view.
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The significance of an articulated 
academic culture for universities 
and society
From the preceding considerations regarding the 
development of an articulated academic culture, it follows 
that a supervisor may consider its efforts significant if the 
doctoral student following this supervision masters all the 
skills, insights and strategies briefly alluded to above. It will 
serve the personal career of the student and it will explore the 
potential and possibilities of the student at the same time.
The university as an academic institution may benefit by 
investing more in the career of such a student in the spirit 
of ‘growing your own timber.’ A student participating in 
a well-grounded academic culture will be intellectually 
mature enough to handle the challenges of life, either within 
or outside the academia, with intellectual honesty and 
accountability.
We may summarise the key elements of my plea for 
establishing an academic culture at universities as follows 
(focused on the role of supervision). The supervisor should 
at least succeed in achieving the following goals:
•	 To create an awareness amongst doctoral students 
regarding the diverse paradigms within the discipline 
in question (paradigms in the sense of an unavoidable 
theoretical view of reality).
•	 To obtain a brief overview of the modern era since 
the Renaissance, including the significance of the 
Enlightenment (the 18th century as the era of conceptual 
rationalism), the historicism of the 19th century and the 
linguistic turn of the 20th century.
•	 To be sensitive to manifestations of the nature-freedom 
dialectic permeating all academic disciplines since the 
Renaissance.
•	 To understand why positivism as a reductionist 
philosophy of science is currently outdated.
•	 To know the difference between logical validity and 
scientific truth, supported by the insight that through the 
principle of sufficient reason (ground) scientific thinking 
is pointed beyond logic to the ontic grounds upon which 
truth claims can be articulated.
•	 To account for primitive terms and the issue of irreducibility 
and, thus, respond to the perennial philosophical problem 
of the coherence of irreducibles found in all academic 
disciplines.
•	 To realise that understanding and concept-formation 
always proceed from basic indefinable terms, explaining 
why defining cannot go on ad infinitum.
•	 To realise that a theoretical framework is much more 
comprehensive than something that could be summarised 
in a single paragraph.
•	 To appreciate both the elements of continuity and 
discontinuity within scholarly theories, also known as 
persistent themes and scientific revolutions.
•	 To be able to question the problematic and mistaken 
idea that certain sciences are ‘exact’ – with reference to 
examples from the natural sciences.
•	 To master argumentative skills – at least those found and 
discussed in informal logic.
•	 To understand the nature of scholarly communication 
and in particular the status of ‘facts’ without the various 
academic disciplines. [The example given in this context 
focused on the (neo)Darwinian belief in gradualism (with 
its apriori philosophical assumption regarding continuous 
transitions) and the reality of discontinuity (found in the fossil 
record and the currently living world), characterised by Stephan 
Gould as stasis (constancy).]
Between the lines of these goals one may discern the necessity 
and importance of more explicit education in the field of 
philosophy of science because, without an understanding 
of the philosophical foundations of the various academic 
disciplines, supervision on the doctoral level may become a 
victim of one or another scientific paradigm, instead of self-
critically and consciously accounting for the theoretical view 
of reality from which both the supervisor and the doctoral 
student proceed (and it does not necessarily need to be the 
same paradigm!).
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